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INEVITABLE ERRORS: THE PREPONDERANCE 
OF THE EVIDENCE STANDARD 
IN CIVIL LITIGATION 
James Brook* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Once a trial has begun, the legal system stands committed to de-
ciding the issues of fact that are crucial to the case being tried. Our 
society accepts the fact that a verdict must be arrived at even though a 
significant amount of uncertainty may exist at the time of decision as to 
the correctness of the verdict. The factfinder is not afforded the option, 
which might be unavoidably attractive in many cases, of refusing to 
decide or even of insisting that more or better evidence be brought to 
his attention if he must settle the disputed facts. In a system in which 
disputed facts are judged by fallible humans, as opposed to one such as 
trial by ordeal which calls upon divine guidance, it is acknowledged 
that, even under the best circumstances, errors will occur. That errors 
will occur may be inevitable, but it is also exceedingly troubling. 
Rules relating to the conduct of trials may be evaluated on the 
basis of the level of error that may result from their use. The only rule 
that would ensure the absence of errors at trial would be one that out-
lawed trials altogether. Otherwise, the choice of rules relating to trial 
affects and is affected by judgments, conscious or otherwise, regarding 
the number and types of errors that will flow from the introduction of a 
particular rule. A second matter of concern is how that level and distri-
bution of errors relates generally to other values in the society. 
This Article will consider one particular rule relating to the trial 
process: The burden of persuasion placed upon litigants in the stan-
dard civil trial situation. 1 Generally, in order to prevail, the party with 
• Associate Professor of Law, New York Law School; B.A., 1968, Harvard University; J.D., 
1972, Harvard University. 
1. On the "burden of persuasion" as one of two aspects of what is more generally called the 
burden of proof, see James, Burdens oj' Proof, 47 VA. L. REV. 51 (1961). The term refers to the 
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the burden of persuasion must prove his case "by a preponderance of 
the evidence" offered at triaP What can it mean to say that this is the 
burden placed upon, for example, the plaintiff? At first glance, this 
may not seem a particularly tricky question; the standard seems to call 
for a simple weighing procedure which is no more subtle than the com-
mon sense notion expressed in such ideas as majority rule or seeing the 
better person win. The standard is sometimes thought to be only deter-
minative in that rare situation where the case is a dead heat or tie to the 
trier of fact. 3 
Whatever common sense may say, the meaning to be given this 
standard, at least as developed by a number of courts and legal schol-
ars, and what it reveals about how the trial process is to operate is far 
from simple. Mter appreciating the complexity of this standard, one 
may easily understand why a survey of jurors conducted in 1937 re-
vealed that the proposition of law the jurors reported they had most 
difficulty understanding was the "preponderance of the evidence" 
standard.4 
This Article begins by introducing a particular approach to the 
preponderance standard, a method that makes use of some basic 
probability theory. Although this model is termed a probability ap-
proach, its development involves only the most simple arithmetic and is 
neither highly theoretical nor abstract. Understanding the model re-
quires no particular mathematical sophistication and the model, in fact, 
has been adopted by a number of courts with no difficulty.s This ap-
proach has the virtue of carrying with it a result that serves as its justifi-
cation since it reduces erroneous verdicts to a minimum. The Article 
then reviews criticisms of this model and its alternatives which still 
need of the party assigned this burden to convince the factfinder of the truth of his assertion when 
the question is ultimately placed before the factfinder for determination. 
2. MCCORMICK'S HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 339, at 793 (2d ed. 1972) [herein-
after cited as MCCORMICK]. This standard may not be applied in every case; for example, where 
the particular jurisdiction requires proof in a class of cases by a "clear and convincing evidence" 
standard. See id. § 340. 
3. See. e.g., Winter, The Jury and the Risk of Nonpersuasion,5 LAW & SOC'y REV. 335, 339 
(1971). 
4. Conference Report, Trial by Jury, 11 U. CIN. L. REV. 119, 192 n.IS (1937). While the 
Report did not indicate what instruction these jurors were presented with, it is tempting to surmise 
that the instruction involved something like the "actual belief in truth" standard, discussed i'!fra, 
notes 29-47 and accompanying text. McCormick's classic treatise, after reviewing the confusion 
that surrounds the term, concludes that where no pattemjury instruction is available, "trial judges 
would be wise to search for the locally accepted phraseology and adhere to it religiously." Mc-
CORMICK, supra note 2, § 339, at 796. 
5. See MCCORMICK, supra note 2, cases cited at 794 n.56. 
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have their adherents. In considering these alternatives, a particular 
question should be kept in mind: Do they offer convincing reasons for 
moving away from an approach which claims to offer a chance to mini-
mize errors? 
II. A PROBABILITY ,ApPROACH 
For present purposes and to keep the discussion manageable, sup-
pose that the resolution of a particular case has come down to a single 
disputed factual issue, X.6 In order to win, the plaintiff must satisfy his 
burden of persuasion that fact X is true. In other words, there must be 
more evidence tending to show that X is true than evidence against this 
proposition. The standard is not construed to mean more evidence in a 
strictly quantitative sense as in the volume of evidence or the number 
of witnesses who have appeared. Rather, the amount of evidence is a 
qualitative standard, weighed in terms of its ability to convince. The 
standard is translated into a requirement that, based on the totality of 
evidence produced, it appears that X is more likely to be true than 
false. 
Statements made in terms of likelihood lend themselves to expla-
nation and quantification using the theory of probability. The asser-
tion that the probability of a statement being true equals a specific 
number is meant to be a measurement of the likelihood that it will tum 
out to be true. The number allotted must be between zero and one; the 
higher the likelihood, the higher the number. If the probability is given 
as zero, then the statement is definitely not true. If the probability is 
given as one, the statement is definitely true. To declare that the state-
ment "X is true" is more likely than "X is false" is only to say that the 
probability of "X is true" itself being true is greater than that of "X is 
false" being true. In other words, it may be said that the probability of 
X, denoted P(X), is greater than the probability of not-x. 
One more fundamental axiom of the probability calculus can now 
be introduced. Two statements are said to be mutually exclusive if they 
cannot both be true at the same time. Under all traditional definitions 
of probability, the probability that one of two mutually exclusive state-
6. Even with this admittedly artificial assumption, the problem is difficult enough. An en-
tirely separate set of problems must be faced if we open the question to include the more realistic 
situations where a party's case depends on the conjunction of several propositions and inferences 
made upon inferences. See Schum, Book Review, 77 MICH. L. REV. 446 (1979); Wagner, Book 
Review, 1979 DUKE L.J. 1071. 
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ments will be true is equal to the sum of their individual probabilities. 
That is, if A and B are mutually exclusive, then 
peA or B) = peA) + PCB). 
In the present case, X and not-X are mutually exclusive since a 
statement cannot be both true and false. Furthermore, P(X or not-X) 
must equal one. It is certain that either X will be true or it will be false. 
It follows from this assumption that 
I = P(X) + P(Not-X). 
Looking at this equation, it is obvious that the statement that X is more 
probable than not-X is equivalent to saying that P(X) is greater than .5. 
With this relatively simple derivation, the description of plaintiffs 
burden has been translated to the showing that P(X) is greater than .5. 
T.his interpretation of the preponderance standard is frequently relied 
upon by the courts.7 But how is such a requirement to be understood? 
Typically statements are considered either true or false. What interpre-
tation or meaning can be given to the probability of a statement's truth? 
The most commonly given interpretation of this type of measure de-
scribes the probability in terms of the relative frequency, the proportion 
of times, that the statement would be true over a long series of identical 
experiments or investigations. For example, the probability that a sin-
gle fair throw of a fair die will show a four is equal to one-sixth, be-
cause over many throws of the die it is believed that one-sixth of them 
will turn up a four. Similarly, it might be said that the probability is 
one-eighth that a single law student chosen at random will be left-
handed, because, out of numerous random choices, one-eighth of the 
selections would result in a student displaying this characteristic. This 
interpretation could also follow from the fact that one-eighth of all of 
the students in law school were left-handed, provided the choosing 
could actually be done randomly every time. 8 
An occasionally raised argument against applying even the sim-
plest probability notion to legal factfinding is a conception, or rather a 
misconception, that probability statements make sense only when made 
about a future event. Legal factfinding usually concerns itself with 
what has already happened and probability theory is thought to be ir-
relevant to such questions. At one point, this notion had even received 
7. See supra note 5. 
8. For a more thorough explanation of the relative frequency concept of probability and of 
the "subjectivist" approach which follows il!fra, notes 11-15 and accompanying text, see Cullison, 
Probability Ana{ysis 0/" Judicial Fact-Finding: A Preliminary Outline o/"the Subjective Approach, 
1969 U. TOL. L. REv. 538, 538-63. 
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support from the New York Court of Appeals when it rejected the in-
troduction of probabilistic evidence relevant to a past event, explaining 
that "[t]he fact to be established in this case was not the probability of a 
future event, but whether an occurrence asserted by the people to have 
happened had actually taken place."9 
This rejection of the use of probabijity statements to apply to un-
certain past events, however, does not hold up to scrutiny, and more 
recent writers are in agreement that it need not stand in the way of the 
use of probability analysis at trial. lO The probability that a die already 
thrown, but unseen, has come up a four is the same as the probability 
that the die will come up a four when next thrown. Similarly, the 
probability that a given law student already chosen at random will turn 
out to be left-handed when asked is equal to the probability that a stu-
dent yet to be chosen at random will have this characteristic. 
A more serious problem with applying the relative frequency 
probability concept in trial is that for the typical factual issue, unlike 
the examples just given, it is difficult, if not impossible, to conceptualize 
what a large number of identical trials would mean. One can conceive 
of a large number of identical experiments tossing a die or choosing a 
single student at random. However, it hardly makes sense to speak of 
the proportion of times one expects to find X true in a large number of 
identical cases involving the same parties and complex situation. Legal 
decisionmaking deals with events that are not only in actuality unique 
(every throw of a die is unique), but also conceptually unique so that 
the frequency interpretation of probability statements cannot comforta-
bly be applied to them. 
In such situations, a second interpretive theory of probability, dis-
tinct from the frequency interpretation, seems more appropriate. 11 The 
formulation of what are referred to as "subjective" or "personal" 
probabilities rests on the notion that an individual's statements such as 
"P(X) = C," where C is some number between 0 and 1, can be under-
9. People v. Risley, 214 N.Y. 75, 86, 108 N.E. 200, 203 (1915). This case is discussed in 
Tribe, Trial By Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the Legal Process, 84 HARV. L. REv. 1329, 
1344-45 (1971). 
10. M. FINKELSTEIN, QUANTITATIVE METHODS IN LAW 62-63 (1978); Tribe, supra note 9, at 
1344-45. 
II. Iversen, Operationalizing the Concept of Probability in Legal-Social Science Research, 5 
LAW & SOC'y REv. 331 (1971); Kaplan, .Decision Theory and the Fac(/inding Process, 20 STAN. L. 
REv. 1065, 1066-67 (1968). While the basic idea behind subjective probability has apparently 
existed for a long time, the rigorous development of the concept is relatively recent, occurring 
within the past sixty years. See Kaye, TIre Laws of Probability and the Law of the Land, 47 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 34, 42 n.31 (1979). 
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stood as stating the speaker's degree of belief in X's truth. This in tum 
is reflected in his willingness to place a bet on the proposition or, 
rather, his response to different wagers offered to him. So, for example, 
a person indifferent to taking either side of a bet regarding a state-
ment's truth, when offered five-to-one odds, is said to possess a subjec-
tive probability of one-sixth that the statement is true. If he favors one 
side or the other of this offered bet even slightly, his subjective 
probability is said to be either higher or lower than one-sixth. There 
are various formulations of subjective probability theory and each 
could be developed in far more detail than here. However, for present 
purposes, it suffices to state that a trier would have a subjective 
probability of greater than .5 that X is true if he would choose to bet 
that way when instructed to pick one side of an even money bet about 
X.12 
Subjective probabilities depend, of course, on the individual mak-
ing the probability statement. However, it can be shown that everyone 
obeys all of the conventional rules of probability theory as long as it is 
postulated that the decisionmaker displays some characteristics of ra-
tional behavior, in the sense of utility or profit maximization. The deci-
sionmaker must be consistent in assigning probabilities and the 
probabilities assigned to X and not-X must obey the rule: 
P(X) + P(not-X) = I 
If these factors are not met, it can be shown that, by a careful choice of 
bets against him, the decisionmaker can be turned into' a "money 
pump" in favor of one side or the other.13 It may also be supposed, 
although subject to somewhat more debate, that the "subjectivist" deci-
sionmaker would turn "objectivist" on any occasion when an objective 
relative frequency probability estimate can be made and is available to 
him. That is, the decisionmaker might be required to give a subjective 
12. It should be noted that as the notion is developed, the person whose statement of subjec-
tive probability is being considered is put in a position where he must choose one side or the otherj 
he cannot simply sit out the game. This becomes important when the concept is applied to the 
legal factfinder. 
If it seems somewhat oppressive to demand a choice, even in this metaphorical sense, a more 
rigorous development of the subjective interpretation would avoid this impression. Thus, the indi-
vidual's choice could be arranged as one where he can only win. He might be asked whether he 
would prefer the chance to get a wonderful gift if the proposition X turns out to be true or the 
chance to get the same gift if X turns out to be false. In such an instance, he would have no reason 
not to choose and to do the best he could. 
As an example in a nonlegal context of a probability statement which makes sense only under 
the subjective interpretation, consider the statement, "I'd say there's a five percent probability that 
the Mets will make the World Series this year." 
13. Kaye, supra note II, at 43 n.32. 
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probability of exactly one-sixth to the possibility of a fair die turning 
up a four following a fair throw, for example, if he is to be considered 
rational, or at least someone whose decisions are worthy of our atten-
tion and respect. 14 
Such a formulation of the preponderance of the evidence standard 
calls for the trier of fact to find for the plaintiff if and only if the 
probability of the plaintiff's assertion about the fact in dispute is greater 
than .5. It is appropriate and necessary to ask what justification exists 
for using this particular decision rule or, in fact, for using any rule 
under the banner of "the preponderance of the evidence." It could be 
argued that this type of rule and particularly the choice of the .5 bench-
mark are unavoidable. If one chose a point below .5, victory would 
clearly be given to the weaker of two cases, and to pick any number 
greater than .5 but less than 1.0, since certainty cannot be required, 
would be an "arbitrary" selection, since no natural or obvious 
breakpoint exists between the two numbers. 15 
Other litigation decisions, however, are made under rules calling 
for proof "by clear and convincing evidence" or "beyond a reasonable 
doubt." Both of these standards call for some kind of evaluation in this 
realm of greater probabilities, even if the measure may not be exactly 
quantified. In fact, in the case of the criminal standard, it is generally 
thought to be appropriate that no particular mathematical measure is 
set forth. It might be suggested that the reason the ordinary civil stan-
dard is lower and more easily met than the other two is that decisions 
to be made under the former standards are generally less important 
and of less consequence than other litigation.16 This generalization 
hardly seems convincing, given a world of multi-million dollar civil 
suits. 
A more satisfactory explanation for the appropriateness of the pre-
ponderance standard in of(:l~ary civil suits is that it appears to treat the 
two parties to the litigation equally. To do otherwise would be to take 
sides unfairly, to impose a burden on one party not imposed on the 
other. This argument that the standard is the only "fair" one under the 
14. Id. at 44 n.35; Tribe, supra note 9, at 1348. Of course, a rational person might have 
reasons to suspect that a given die or a given throw is not "fair" and that hence the probability of a 
particular number appearing would not be one-sixth. That is why it is critical to stipulate that a 
fair situation exists. The fact that the probability estimate may be different given more informa-
tion is a feature of both the frequency and subjective interpretations. See i'!fra note 57 for a 
discussion of Bayes' Theorem. 
IS. M. FINKELSTEIN, supra note 10, at 66. 
16. See Jackson v. Delaware, L. & W. R. Co., III N.J.L. 487, -, 170 A. 22, 23-24 (1933). 
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circumstances has great intuitive appeal and seems, until recently, to 
have been unquestioned. I7 Toward the conclusion of this Article, how-
ever, a recent analysis, suggesting that the question of "fairness" may 
be more complex than is first imagined, will be explored. Considera-
tion will be given to Professor Finkelstein's contention that, despite all 
its virtues, this decision standard may not tr~at the parties equally in 
one respect; it may well result in more erroneous decisions going 
against one party than the other. 
The principal argument given today as justification for the ".5 or 
better" rule, at least in academic circles, is one that might not be intui-
tively apparent. It can be demonstrated that this rule is the one which 
must be adopted if the decisionmaker's goal is to minimize the absolute 
number of total errors which will arise from the course of decisions in 
the long run.I8 Assuming that the plaintiff and defendant dispute only 
the truth of a single proposition, X, then the total number of instances 
in which either the plaintiff or the defendant is denied a verdict errone-
ously will be minimized if the verdict is granted to the plaintiff if and 
only if he has shown the probability of X being true to exceed, even by 
the smallest measure, .5. The argument for adoption of such a rule, 
which promises to minimize errors, is obvious. If one assumes that the 
disutility of an erroneous verdict in a civil suit is the same whether that 
verdict incorrectly goes against a plaintiff or a defendant,19 arriving at 
the desirability of the rule, minimizing total errors, seems to follow 
from the most simple rule, utilitarian calculus,zo 
17. M. FINKELSTEIN, supra note 10, at 65-66; Winter, supra note 3, at 337. 
18. Ball, TIre Moment of Truth: Probability Theory and Standards of Proof, 14 V AND. L. REV. 
807,822-23 (1961); Cullison, supra note 8, at 569; Lempert, Modeling Relevance, 75 MICH. L. REV. 
1021, 1033-34 (1977). For the most general mathematical proof in this area, see Kaye, Book Re-
view, 89 YALE L.J. 601, 605 n.19 (1980). 
19. This assumption seems compelled either by the practical difficulties of arriving at any 
alternative figures worthy of confidence or by an affirmative belief that to hold otherwise would 
introduce an unacceptable bias into the trial process. See M. FINKELSTEIN, supra note 10, at 67; 
Kaye, TIre Paradox of the Gatecrasher and Other Stories, 1979 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 101, 103; Lempert, 
supra note 18, at 1033-34. But see Kaplan, supra note II, at 1072. 
20. On the utility calculation in this situation, see Kaye, Probability Theory Meets Res Ipsa 
LoqUitur, 77 MICH. L. REV. 1456, 1467 n.43 (1979). Making the decision one of utility also ex-
plains why the criminal standard of "beyond a reasonable doubt" is so very different from the civil 
standard. It is not because criminal cases are generally "more important" than civil cases, but 
rather that in the criminal situation the disutilities of the two different types of errors are clearly 
not identical The disutility of the erroneous conviction of an innocent person is thought to be far 
greater than the disutility of an erroneous acquittal of a guilty one. 
Most authorities translate the justification for the rule from the minimization of errors to the 
maximization of utility, but one should not have to be a utilitarian to find much appeal in the rule 
of greater than .5. Whatever ethical theory one holds to be important, it seems that erroneous 
verdicts must be regarded as undesirable and to be avoided, all other things being equal, as often 
1982] INEVITABLE ERRORS 87 
III. Two CASES 
At this point, the lengthy development of the preponderance stan-
dard, culminating in a rule stated in terms of a probability of .5 or 
greater, may seem to have been a great labor to very little effect. One 
may easily believe this endeavor has been merely a matter of restating 
the obvious and taking pains to restate it in what is, for many, the more 
difficult form of a probability statement. The actual result may seem 
uncontroversial and unassailable. But this is not the case. The ".5 or 
greater" interpretation of the preponderance standard is far from uni-
versally adopted,21 and has been the subject of much criticism. 
As an introduction to the opposing views, consider two cases, both 
decided by the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in the 1940's, 
which appear to have brought this debate to the surface and are cur-
rently considered central to any discussion of the topic. The situations 
they present read almost like the hypotheticals one would have to in-
vent for purposes of discussion were they not already available. 
Sargent v. Massachusetts Accident Co. 22 involved a suit brought by 
the beneficiary of an accident insurance policy issued to the benefici-
ary's son, Upham Sargent, "a young man of twenty-one, financially 
comfortable, mentally well-balanced, vigorous, athletic, resourceful, 
courageous, a good swimmer, and of some experience in living in wild 
country without provisions."23 Despite these attributes, Sargent never 
returned from a particularly adventurous journey, an attempt to direct 
a kayak down the treacherous Nottaway River of Northwest Quebec. 
The insured was last seen on September 8, 1934. In subsequent 
months, his paddle and a part of his kayak were found, but no other 
evidence of what happened to Upham Sargent was ever discovered. 
The terms of the insurance policy on which a claim was brought cov-
ered death due solely to accident. Thus, the case depended on whether 
the plaintiff had proved by a preponderance of the evidence, which in-
cluded that presented above along with other information attesting to 
the foolhardiness of attempting to take a kayak down the Nottaway, 
that the insured died from an accident within the terms of the policy. 
The trial court directed a verdict for the defendant insurance com-
as possible. The question, in any event, becomes what other values society wants to be weighed' 
against the strong appeal of the error minimizing rule. 
21. "Some courts have boldly accepted this view." MCCORMICK, supra note 2, at 794. 
22. 307 Mass. 246, 29 N.E.2d 825 (1940). 
23. Id. at 247, 29 N.E.2d at 826. 
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pany.24 The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, in setting aside 
the verdict and entering a judgment for the plaintiff, presented its own 
version of the preponderance standard. 
The burden of proof that is on the plaintiff in this case 
does not require him to establish beyond all doubt, or beyond 
a reasonable doubt, that the insured died from accidental in-
jury within the policy. He must prove that by a preponder-
ance of the evidence. It has been held not enough that 
mathematically the chances somewhat favor a proposition to 
be proved; for example, the fact that colored automobiles 
made in the current year outnumber black ones would not 
warrant a finding that an undescribed automobile of a current 
year is colored and not black, nor would the fact that only a 
minority of men die of cancer warrant a findmg that a partic-
ular man did not die of cancer. . . . The weight or ponder-
ance of evidence is its power to convince the tribunal which 
has the determination of the fact, of the actual truth of the 
proposition to be proved. After the evidence has been 
weighed, that proposition is proved by a preponderance of the 
evidence if it is made to appear more likely or probable in the 
sense that actual belief in its truth, derived from the evidence, 
exists in the mind or minds of the tribunal notwithstanding 
any doubts that may still linger there. . . . 
Upon the evidence, in the opinion of a majority of the 
court, a jury could find, not merely that there was a greater 
chance that the insured met his death by accident falling 
within the policy than that he met a different fate, but that 
death by accident within the policy was in fact indicated by a 
preponderance of the evidence.25 
The second case, Smith v. Rapid Transit, Inc. ,26 involved a far less 
romantic journey, that of Betty Smith driving her automobile down 
Main Street in Winthrop, Massachusetts. While on this ride, she was 
forced off the road and into a parked car by a bus, which she described 
only as a "great big, long, wide affair."27 In her suit, she apparently 
only offered evidence that the defendant company was the sole bus op-
erator authorized by the department of public utilities to operate on 
that street, although private or chartered buses were not precluded 
from using it. Massachusetts' Supreme Judicial Court, quoting at 
24. Id. at 246, 29 N.E.2d at 825. 
25. Id. at 250-51,29 N.E.2d at 827 (citations omitted). 
26. 317 Mass. 469, 58 N.E.2d 754 (1945). 
27. Id. at 469, 58 N.E.2d at 754. 
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length from Sargent, overruled exceptions to a verdict directed for the 
defendant, stating, "The most that can be said of the evidence in the 
instant case is that perhaps the mathematical chances somewhat favor 
the proposition that a bus of the defendant caused the accident . . . 
[and] this was not enough."28 
The opinions in these cases point to two general themes of impor-
tance to this discussion. First, it has been argued that the preponder-
ance standard requires that the factfinder do more than arrive at a 
conclusion about the relative likelihood of the truth of the plaintiffs 
contentions. He must act only on the "actual belief in its truth," a con-
cept which is the subject of the next section of this Article. Next, a 
distinct question suggested by the cases and much argued since must be 
considered. Neither case contained an offer of general statistical evi-
dence to bolster the plaintiffs case, such as, in Smith, the proportion of 
all buses going down Main Street operated by the defendant company. 
Nevertheless, the opinions are construed to support the proposition that 
such evidence could never be regarded as sufficient to meet the prepon-
derance standard. It is contended that no party can meet his burden 
only on what is referred to as background statistical evidence and that a 
minimum of particularized or individualized evidence is always re-
quired. This issue presents a question not necessarily of how "high" a 
standard is called for, but of what type of evidence can be permitted to 
meet the standard. 
IV. "ACTUAL BELIEF IN TRUTH" 
Perhaps the most forceful argument in favor of an interpretation 
of the preponderance standard instructing the factfinder to reach a de-
cision based only on his "actual belief' as to the truth of contested facts 
is found in a 1906 article by William Trickett.29 The author first con-
siders the rule which he finds in the then current authorities, much to 
his dissatisfaction, to be the preponderance of probabilities rule. Trick-
ett observed the following: 
A corollary from this rule would be that the juror or the judge 
must in many cases decide in favor of A or B, the parties to 
the suit, that a fact did or did not occur, although he does not 
believe that it occurred or did not occur. 
. . . [T]o believe that there is this greater degree of evi-
28. Id. at 470, 58 N.E.2d at 755. 
29. Trickett, Preponderance of Evidence, And Reasonable Doubt, 10 FORUM 75 (1906). 
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dence of occurrence than of non-occurrence, is not to believe 
the occurrence, rather than the non-occurrence.30 
These rather cryptic comments are given some substance by a hypo-
thetical case Trickett presents. He proposes that party A sues party B 
on a note, the execution of which B denies, and that the two gather up 
teams of witnesses to testify on the issue of whether or not the signature 
is in B's handwriting. First, six witnesses testify in A's favor while only 
five testify for B. No difference appears in the credibility of any of the 
witnesses involved. Trickett concludes that, while any prudent and 
sensible person would remain in a state of doubt, neither believing nor 
disbelieving that B had signed the note, the "ordinary man, juror or 
judge" would be compelled by the preponderance criterion to find for 
A in a court oflaw.31 With this reading in mind, no wonder he argues 
that: 
The rule indicated results in palpable absurdity. The ob-
ject of the law is, or ought to be, to secure the sequence of 
certain results upon certain objective facts. If B signed the 
note he ought to be compelled to pay it. It would be, of 
course, inadmissible to hold that the absolute certainty of the 
jury that he signed it, should be the preliminary to this com-
pulsion. But would it be too much to hold that the jury 
should believe, at least in some low degree, that he signed it? 
Is not the principle abhorrent that B may be coerced into pay-
ing a sum of money to A, when the jury does not believe, even 
in a faint degree, that he promised to pay it, simply because it 
believes that, of the plaintiff's and defendant's respective 
pieces of evidence, that of the former is heavier than that of 
the latter?32 
It seems clear that Trickett's objection to the preponderance rule, 
as he interprets it, is premised on the belief that "weighing the evi-
dence" somehow commits the trier of fact to reach a result rigidly 
based on the number of witnesses or the gross volume of evidence. Per-
haps this conclusion was prompted by the absence, at the time, of a 
well developed treatment of what has been called the subjective inter-
pretation of probability statements. Still, this is hardly a reading of the 
preponderance standard, or even of the word "evidence," that com-
mends itself to common sense. But, even though later authorities clari-
fied the fact that the preponderance standard contemplates evidence as 
30. Id. at 77-78. 
31. Id. at 77. 
32. Id. at 78. 
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measured by its ability to persuade, and not by its sheer bulk, they still 
find appeal in Trickett's idea.33 There continues to be a contention that 
"belief' is a separate and distinct goal, which the factfinder is bound by 
duty to aspire to. So, in 1944, Professor McBaine condemned the no-
tion that the jury should be instructed only to consider whether the 
plaintiffs evidence "is stronger or more convincing than the evidence 
supporting his opponent's assertions."34 This argument is based on 
what initially appears to be a very appealing proposition. 
No prudent man would act as to a matter of importance 
to him if, after talking with several of his acquaintances, his 
state of mind is: "I think 1 will make this investment since 
what I have heard favorable to it impresses me more than 
what 1 have heard against it." People of prudence do not take 
important action involving their self interests when they know 
no more than that the evidence for taking an important step is 
stronger for taking it than it is for not taking it. Before acting 
they entertain stronger convictions.35 
Unfortunately, if the prudent man thinks he is avoiding a decision by 
declining to invest under the circumstances, he operates under the 
crudest form of self-delusion. The choice not to buy is, in itself, a deci-
sion. Such a decision certainly will have consequences, as would a de-
cision to invest. The identical situation confronts the factfinder at trial. 
As was noted earlier, the decision facing a jury is not whether to decide, 
for they are committed to that by their role. Rather it is how to decide 
which of two alternatives, a verdict for the plaintiff or for the defend-
ant, shall be the outcome. This decision must be faced strictly on the 
basis of information then available. 
Trickett and McBaine do not appear, by asking that the jury's goal 
be a "stronger conviction," to be arguing simply for a higher standard 
of proof in the quantitative sense. It is doubtful that they would be any 
more satisfied with a rule requiring a probability of greater than .6 or 
33. See 9 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2498 (3d ed. 1940); James, supra note 1, at 53. For cases, 
in addition to Sargent, adopting the "actual belief' formulation, see MCCORMICK, supra note 2, 
§ 339, at 795 n.S7. 
While the author did not undertake a survey of the law of other common law jurisdictions, it 
appears that a view similar to the American "actual belief' position has had its adherents and 
found its way into cases, at least in England and Australia. R. EGGLESTON, EVIDENCE, PROOF 
AND PROBABILITY 106-07, 109-11 (1978). 
34. McBaine, Burden of Proofi ])egrees of Belief, 32 CALIF. L. REV. 242, 248 (1944). The 
author's position seems to be confused. Toward the end of the article, when he offers recommen-
dations for pattern jury instructions, his statement of the preponderance standard drops any refer-
ence to "actual belief in truth." Id. at 261-62. 
3S. ld. at 248. 
92 TULSA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 18:79 
.75. These scholars seem to be calling for what they perceive as a dif-
ferent kind of decisionmaking in the qualitative sense. The problem is 
that what they seek may be unobtainable in reality. It may soothe the 
conscience of everyone if courtroom controversies were decided and 
pronouncements made only on the basis of what is held to be "actual 
belief' in their wisdom. This practice certainly appears.more appropri-
ate than that of relying on the best guess in even the most important 
situations. But like the prudent investor, the conscientious juror is en-
meshed in a difficult position from which he has no easy escape. Un-
certainty makes educated guessers of everyone. 
More recent commentators have criticized the belief-in-truth argu-
ment,36 and it is tempting to regard it as nothing more than an aberra-
tion not worthy of serious consideration.37 But the idea expressed by 
those earlier writers does not appear to be entirely a thing of the past. 
Recent writings by one British philosopher of science, as well as a few 
legal academicians building on his work,38 have advanced the thesis 
that traditional probability theory, however formulated, is somehow in-
appropriate when applied to legal factfinding. 
An entirely new, rather startling, formulation of probability has 
been advanced, the centerpiece of which seems to be abandoning the 
principle of additivity, the requirement that peA) and P(not-A) must 
always equal one for any statement A. 39 This novel theory has been 
subjected to criticism from the outset.40 The ensuing debate reaches 
such heights of theoretical abstraction in the theory of probability and 
formal logic that it is difficult to know what to make of it. What is 
noteworthy in the present context is that when the arguments finally 
touch ground and are applied to the trial process, the results of this 
36. See Ball, supra note 18; Cullison, supra note 8. 
37. M. FINKELSTEIN, supra note 10, at 65. 
38. L. COHEN, THE PROBABLE AND THE PROVABLE (1977); Brilmayer & Kornhauser. Review: 
Quantitative Methods and Legal .Decisions. 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 116 (1978). 
39. As discussed in Kaye, supra note 11. at 36-38. Cohen apparently considers the notion that 
the probability of a defendant's liability and the probability of his non-liability must equal one to 
be "paradoxical" in some way. 
Suppose the threshold of proof in civil cases were judicially interpreted as being at the 
level of a mathematical probability of .501. Would not judges thereby imply acceptance 
of a system in which the mathematical probability that the unsuccessful litigant deserved 
to succeed might sometimes be as high at .499? This hardly seems the right spirit in 
which to administer justice. 
L. COHEN, supra note 38. at 75. 
40. See Birmingham, Remarks on 'Probability' in Law: Mostly, A Casenote and A Book Re-
view, 12 GA. L. REV. 535. 544-51 (1978); Kaye, supra note 11; Kaye, supra note 19; Schum. Slpra 
note 6; Wagner, supra note 6. 
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highly sophisticated and technical criticism sound strangely familiar. 
Thus, Professors Brilmayer and Kornhauser in a recent article, based 
heavily on this modem non-traditional theory of probability, conclude 
that "[i]t seems implausible to assume, however, that when we have 
little or no evidence about the truth or falsity of a statement we must be 
more than half sure that it is true, or else more than half sure that it is 
false."41 Is this anything more than the wishful thinking of earlier writ-
ers? What is the careful juror, who is trapped after all in the jury box 
and not in the lecture room, to do? The authors suggest that the ra-
tional decisionmaker, faced with so little information that '!Jelief in 
nothing seems possible, should not give up all hope. 
He may then decide to introspect more carefully, consider 
gathering more information about the likelihood of A and 
not-A, or make a decision based on some criterion distinct 
from maximizing expected value. Each of these three tactics 
may present complex, unsolved intellectual problems for the 
decisionmaker, but it is not obvious why, in adopting one of 
them, he would be acting irrationally. One rational strategy 
that does not fit the Bayesian [subjectivist] model is a court's 
finding of "insufficient evidence," that is, that a party simply 
has not adduced sufficient evidence to warrant disturbing the 
status-quo. That the Bayesian system does not adequately ac-
count for a conception such as "sufficient evidence" becomes 
clear ugon examining the premise of additivity at greater 
length. 2 
How realistic is this advice, given the position the jury member is in? 
The authors suggest greater introspection, which is always a good idea 
but hardly guaranteed to lead out of any quandary, or even to make it 
more tractable. The second alternative suggested, that the jury "con-
sider gathering more information," directly contradicts the trial pro-
cess. Disputed facts must be decided by the jury during the process and 
on the basis of the information presented.43 The value found in the 
trial process of simply reaching a conclusion, of settling disputes deci-
sively and for all time, is well accepted and the authors offer no argu-
ment that such a fundamental feature of the process should be 
abandoned. They suggest, finally, that a decisionmaker has the option 
to "make a decision based on some criterion distinct from maximizing 
expected value," but provide no hint as to what other values might be 
41. Brilmayer & Kornhauser, supra note 38, at 142 (footnotes omitted). 
42. Id. 
43. See Kaye, supra note 11, at 47. 
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considered nor as to why such an approach would be at all appropriate 
or desirable in the trial context. 
More curious still is the authors' reference to a court's finding of 
"insufficient evidence" in a context which suggests they believe them-
selves to be describing present practice and not arguing for a new legal 
order. This phrase is explained in a civil case as the finding "that the 
plaintiff has not satisfied his burden of proof."44 Indeed, in this situa-
tion, it can be stated that the plaintiff has produced "insufficient evi-
dence" for his purposes, but it is hardly the case that the jury has acted 
on a belief that there was not sufficient evidence before them to arrive 
at a verdict. A verdict has been reached and it is definitely not one 
which preserves the status quo as the authors contend, at least if the 
doctrine of res judicata is recognized. The plaintiff has not only failed 
to get an order for relief from the defendant, but he has forever lost his 
chance to try again. This is indeed different from the pre-trial position 
as any plaintiff who has turned down a healthy settlement offer only to 
have a jury verdict go against him would clearly agree. The authors 
may wish to argue for a quite different legal order in which a jury, or 
the court acting on the law, could justifiably refuse to make a decision 
because the evidence offered is insufficient to create "actual belief' in 
either the plaintiffs or the defendant's contention. Such a refusal 
would leave both parties with undiminished rights; in particular, the 
right to try again. But, if this is their interest, they must justify such a 
significant reordering on the grounds of the specific values it would 
promote and not simply on the difficulty, under current rules, of reach-
ing a decision. Moreover, they would have to take account of the par-
ticular problem, in such an order, of compensating for the loss in the 
value of a trial as an effective method of dispute resolution producing a 
conclusive result. Even under the present system, it would seem one of 
the least desirable outcomes, especially to the litigants, is a mistrial with 
its prospect' of going through the whole exercise all over again. 
It seems the early exponents of the actual-belief-in-truth concept 
regarded it as actually a way of increasing accuracy and limiting the 
number of errors. This belief, however, cannot be true, at least if the 
resultant standard deviates from one calling only for a decision based 
on the preponderance of the probabilities.4s Most authorities now con-
44. Brilmayer & Kornhauser, S/lpra note 38, at 142 n.94. 
45. At another point in their article, Professors Brilmayer and Kornhauser appear to accept 
the greater than .5 rule, though they refer to the "degree of belief of .5 or greater" as "probably" 
satisfying the preponderance standard. Id. at 139-40. It is unclear if this is an inconsistency on 
1982] INEVITABLE ERRORS 95 
elude that a jury instructed to find an "actual belief' before making a 
finding for the plaintiff, to the extent that the jury pays attention to the 
instruction at all, will act only when the subjective probability attained 
is substantially greater than .5.46 Any argument for this result which 
increases the expected number of errors should be based on the articu-
lation of and the commitment to other distinct values which it could be 
expected to further. 
Lengthy quotes from the proponents of this position have been 
presented in an attempt to decipher the exact purpose these authors 
believe the actual-belief-in-truth requirement is designed to serve. 
What value does the requirement enhance that might possibly offset the 
increased number of errors that would be expected to follow from its 
adoption? To a great extent, these passages display a form of denial; 
namely, a denial that decisions have to be made and under conditions 
that are far from ideal. Beyond this, however, lies something much 
more complex. There exists the idea of a separate and independent 
value in having a judicial system that is seen, by the members of the 
community asked to serve as jurors and by the community at large 
which is expected to respect the outcomes of the system, to make deci-
sions premised only upon the basis of "truth" and of "actual belief' 
and nothing else. Even if it is recognized that the best trial process will 
inevitably result in decisions involving great doubt and in fact some 
finite number of truly erroneous decisions, there is a good to be served, 
it is argued, by a rule which presents a different face to the outside 
world.47 
This notion is not as far-fetched as it may first appear. Certainly, 
it is adhered to extensively in the criminal law area, but is it an idea 
their part or if it may be viewed as consistent upon realizing that the authors seem to favor a form 
of probability in which P(X) =.5 would be a harder standard to meet than it would be under any 
traditional theory of probability which accepts the additivity axiom. 
46. Cullison, supra note 8, at 571. McCormick indicates that the actual-belief-in-truth rule 
seems equivalent to the "clear, strong and convincing proof" standard "hitherto thought to be 
appropriate only in exceptional cases." MCCORMICK, supra note 2, at 795. 
There is some empirical evidence to suggest that jurors told to decide by "a preponderance of 
the evidence" and nothing more may in effect translate this into a requirement substantially above 
.5. Simon & Mahan, Quantflying Burdens of Proof, 5 LAW & SOC'y REv. 319 (1971), report that a 
group of jurors questioned by the authors translated the preponderance standard into something 
like a need for a probability of .75 or greater. A group of judges, on the other hand, interpreted it 
as calling only for a probability of .55. Id. at 325. The result in the case of the jurors is open to 
criticism, however, as the question presented to them involved criminal law. In fact, they were 
asked at what probability they would "convict" the defendant. Id. Posing the question in this 
manner could have easily distorted the jurors' understanding of the standard. 
47. For criticism of this notion, see Cullison, supra note 8, at 572-76. 
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which carries much weight in civil litigation? This may be, in the end, 
an empirical question. Would potential jurors be less willing to serve, 
or would they suffer some negative emotional consequence from hav-
ing served, if the court asked them to take a measure of responsibility 
for decisions made even when "actual belief' does not exist? Would 
the public respect less decisions made by a system that only balanced 
probabilities and made no requirement that the factfinder be willing to 
state an "actual belief' in anything? The concept of "actual belief' 
being explored is obviously not a probabilistic or statistical concept. It 
is essentially a cultural or psychological question of when an individual 
is prepared, short of absolute certainty, to tum his innermost thoughts 
into a statement of "I believe" on which others may judge both that of 
which he speaks as well as him personally. 
The arguments in favor of the actual-belief-in-truth standard ap-
parently require that consideration and importance be granted to the 
appearance and public perception of the judicial process. Attention is 
to be given to the process independent of the results in any single case 
or set of cases. Consideration of such factors, however, does not re-
quire acceptance of the "actual belief' standard. However, such con-
sideration serves to introduce a set of concerns which have not been 
dealt with up to this point. The next section of this Article returns to 
such questions with the advantage of a previous thoughtful analysis 
which acknowledges that the choice of a rule may require a willingness 
to accept a greater level of errors in return for furthering other impor-
tant values and which attempts to offer some guidance as to what alter-
native values may be. 
v. PURELY STATISTICAL EVIDENCE 
The Smith 48 case, where a driver brought suit against a bus com-
pany claiming that its bus ran her off the road, provides a starting point 
for this discussion. In the actual case, the plaintiff offered no statistical 
evidence. Imagine that she had, however, offered evidence which es-
tablished that during the period in question four of every five buses 
travelling down Main Street were owned by the defendant company. 
Suppose further that this were the only evidence presented by the 
plaintiff relative to the identity of the owner of the bus. If the identity 
of the owner of the bus were the only issue of fact in the case, how 
48. Smith v. Rapid Transit, Inc., 317 Mass. 469, 58 N.E.2d 754 (1945). Seesupra notes 26·28 
and accompanying text. 
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should the trial proceed? Would the defendant be entitled to a directed 
verdict because the plaintiff had offered no "individualized" evidence 
about the owner of the bus in this case? Or, assuming that the defend~ 
ant presented no evidence on this issue, would the plaintiff have been 
entitled to a directed verdict, since she had shown ''by a preponderance 
of the evidence" that the bus was owned by the defendant? Or is it just 
a factual question for the jury, in which case one may well ask how the 
jury may apply the preponderance standard. 
This hypothetical on the use of mathematically expressed back-
ground evidence is only one of a large number considered by Professor 
Tribe in his well~known article discussing the phenomenon which he 
terms "trial by mathematics."49 Tribe's article covers many particular 
instances of the legal use of mathematical evidence and theory, but the 
overall purpose of his piece is to counter what he perceived, while writ-
ing in 1971, as the growing trend, at least in academic literature, to-
wards a belief that mathematically described evidence and math~ 
ematical techniques of analysis should play a greater role in legal 
factfinding and in the analysis oflegal rules. 50 Tribe presents a variety 
of arguments against the use of mathematics at trial, most of which rest 
on the proposition that the use of such evidence will too often lead to 
its inevitable misuse. "[T]he very mystery that surrounds mathematical 
arguments-the relative obscurity that makes them at once impenetra~ 
ble by the layman and impressive to him---creates a continuing risk 
that he will give such arguments a credence they may not deserve and a 
weight they cannot logically claim."51 So, for example, Tribe asserts 
that the jury, which has received quantified evidence as well as other 
"soft" or impressionistic evidence, will tend to be overly impressed and 
influenced by the former merely because it seems precise, scientific, and 
objective.52 
In a recent critique of this article, Professors Saks and Kidd, both 
psychologists, argue that Tribe's arguments are based only on his per-
sonal assumptions about how well a lay jury can utilize such informa-
tion and that his assumptions, when compared to the results of 
49. Tribe, supra note 9. 
50. Id. at 1329-32. Tribe stated that he wrote his article "in reaction to a growing and bewil-
dering literature of praise for mathematical precision in the trial process, a literature that has 
tended to catalogue or to assume the virtues of mathematical approaches quite as uncritically as 
earlier writers tended to deny their relevance." Id. at 1332 (footnotes omitted). 
51. Id. at 1334. 
52. Id. at 1358-60. 
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empirical studies of human decisionmaking, are clearly inaccurate. 53 
In particular, they review findings that indicate that most people, when 
confronted with background statistical information in addition to case~ 
specific information, tend to undervalue, not overvalue, the back~ 
ground information.54 Contrary to Tribe's assumption, individuals do 
not tend to be overly impressed with statistical information, such as the 
percentage of buses in the hypothetical. If anything, they give it too 
little attention. As damaging as these empirical findings may be to 
many of Tribe's arguments, his position is not necessarily completely 
untenable. Tribe clearly states, throughout his work, that his concern 
with the use of mathematics at trial is not only that it may increase the 
number of erroneous verdicts, but that even if it were to decrease the 
number of expected errors, there are other reasons to avoid the use of 
mathematics. He contends that a trial must be considered not only as a 
means to an end, but as an important social event in itself having "rit~ 
ual" value. 55 
Before further exploration of this argument, consider Tribe's view 
of the bus hypothetical discussed earlier. What should be done when 
only background statistical evidence is presented by the plaintiff? 
Tribe correctly asserted that this need not necessarily lead to a directed 
verdict for the plaintiff. It will not even have to be true that a rational 
and sensible jury would have to find for Mrs. Smith, since by the time 
the trial ends, more information will be known. Certain background 
statistical evidence which points the finger at the defendant has been 
introduced, but the plaintiff failed to introduce any other evidence on 
point. Such information in itself may be regarded as highly relevant. 
Ifit truly was the defendant's bus that was to blame, why was the plain-
tiff not able to get any other evidence to bolster her case? "[A]bsent 
satisfactory explanation"56 of the plaintiffs failure to come forward 
53. Saks & Kidd, Human Information Processing and Adjudication: Trial by Heuristics, IS 
LAW & Soe'y REv. 123 (1981). 
. Influential as Tribe's paper has been, like much legal scholarship, it is a Swiss 
cheese of assumptions about human behavior-in this case human decision-making 
processes-which are asserted as true simply because they fall within the wide reach of 
the merely plaUsible, not because any evidence is adduced on their behalf. 
Id. at 125 (footnotes omitted). 
54. Id. at 126-31. 
55. See i'!fra, textual discussion beginning at note 60. 
56. Tribe, supra note 9, at 1349. See also Kaye, supra note 19, at 106-08. Of course, the 
reasoning behind this argument may be a bit circular. If the rule of law were that the plaintiff 
could satisfy her initial burden of production by offering statistical evidence alone, then the fact 
that she offered no additional evidentiary support might not be "suspicious." It might signify only 
that she did not waste her resources gathering up more and better information when she had 
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with anything more than the general eighty percent figure, one may 
conclude that one's subjective probability that the defendant com-
pany's bus was responsible is far lower than .8 and even lower than .5. 
It is important to note that such arguments do not signal, in any 
way, a difficulty with statistical evidence or probability theory. The 
probability that any statement is true wijl. always be subject to change 
when new relevant information is available. If it is believed, or there 
exists some way of showing, that a given bit of information is more 
likely to be true if the defendant's bus were not involved than if it were, 
this should indeed make the probability estimate that it was defend-
ant's bus decrease. Probability theory does more than merely conflict 
with this intuitive notion. It actually provides a mechanism, known as 
Bayes' Theorem, for quantifying the effect of such additional informa-
tion.57 Assume that, based on the statistical evidence offered, one ini-
tially believes there is an .8 chance that the defendant's bus was 
responsible for the mishap. Surprisingly, no additional evidence is 
presented regarding ownership of the bus; it seems six times as likely 
that plaintiff would have no further evidence to offer against defendant 
if it had not been, in fact, defendant's bus than if it had been. Bayes' 
Theorem would then support a conclusion that the probability that it 
enough to survive a motion by the defendant for a directed verdict. This circularity is probably 
more theoretical than real, however. The plaintiff would normally decide how much evidence to 
collect and bring to trial based on her concerns about what counterevidence the defendant might 
offer and not just on her desire to meet the minimum standard required to survive a motion for a 
directed verdict. 
57. Bayes' Theorem is by now no stranger to legal literature. See, e.g., Kaye, supra note 19, 
at 106-08; Tribe, supra note 9, at 1352. The Tribe article is part of a running debate. touched off 
by Finkelstein & Fairley, A Bayesian Approach to Ident!fication Evidence, 83 HARV. L. REv. 489 
(1970), on whether Bayes' Theorem should actually be used by the jury to interpret the accumu-
lated effect of all of the evidence before it. See Kaye, supra note II, at 34 nn.5 & 6. 
The purpose in introducing Bayes' Theorem here is only to emphasize the fact that efforts to 
combine purely statistical evidence offered at trial with other information available to the jury are 
not at all inconsistent with probability theory, but may in fact be well explained by its techniques. 
Before setting forth Bayes' Theorem, conditional probabilities should be defined. The condi-
tional probability of X given E, written P(X/E), is simply the probability that X will be true given 
that E is already known to be true. Thus, the probability that a fair die will tum up a four given 
that it turns up an even number of dots is one-third. The probability that the die will tum up a 
four given that it turns up an odd number of dots is, of course, zero. 
Let X be a proposition and E a piece of information which mayor may not be relevant to it. 
Then Bayes' Theorem, in one of its many forms, says 
P(X) P(E/X) P(X/E) 
P(not X) P(E/not X) P(not X/E) 
The ratio P(X)/p(not X) is called the "prior odds" of X. that is, the odds that X is true 
considered before any knowledge of E. The ratio P(X/E)/p(not X/E) is called the "posterior 
odds" ofX. It represents the revised estimate of the odds of X being true once it is known that E is 
true. 
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was defendant's bus would only be .4, which would be insufficient to 
satisfy the plaintiffs burden.58 
Of course, if the plaintiff could give a "satisfactory explanation" of 
why she was unable to produce additional individualistic evidence, the 
initial high probability would not be changed and plaintiff would have 
met her burden, at least in the sense of establishing a case which the 
defendant would then have had to meet with evidence of its own. 
Tribe agrees with this statement, but would depart from the strictly 
probabilistic model in the case where the initial background 
probability is so great or the inference to be drawn from the lack of 
other evidence is so relatively weak that the fact of the nonproduction 
of other evidence would not plunge the overall estimate below .5.59 
Even if the defendant company were shown to own ninety-nine percent 
of all buses running down Main Street, Tribe argues that this fact 
alone, absent "satisfactory explanation" of the absence of other proof, 
should as a matter of law never be sufficient to shift the burden of com-
ing forward with evidence on the issue of identity to the defendant. 60 
He argues that whether or not the subjective probability that it was the 
defendant's bus remains above .5, 
absent satisfactory explanation, there are compelling reasons 
of policy to treat the subjective probability as less than .5-or 
simply as insufficient to support a verdict for plaintiff. To 
give less force to the plaintiffs evidentiary omission would 
eliminate any incentive for plaintiffs to do more than establish 
the background statistics. The upshot would be a regime in 
which the company owning four-fifths of the blue buses, how-
ever careful, would have to pay for five-fifths of all unex-
plained blue bus accidents-a result as inefficient as it is 
unfair.61 
58. Using the formula given supra, note 57, X represents the fact that it was defendant's bus 
that caused the accident. E represents the information that no other evidence besides background 
statistical evidence was offered by the plaintiff. The statement in the text is then equivalent to 
80 1 40 
-.-=-
20 6 60 
59. Tribe, supra note 9, at 1361. 
60. Id. at 1349. 
61. Id. at 1349-50 (emphasis in original; footnote omitted). Tribe makes essentially the same 
point in an earlier footnote. 
[C]ases like Smith are entirely sensible if understood. . . as insisting on the presentation 
of some non-statistical and "individualized" proof of identity before compelling a part>, 
to pay damages, and even before compelling him to come forward with defensive eVI-
dence, absent an adequate explanation of the failure to present such individualized 
proof. 
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The reasons offered by Tribe in support of his position are far 
from convincing. The argument that any incentive for the plaintiff to 
present less evidence than she maximally might could be extended to 
any case where a plaintiff has initially satisfied her burden of produc-
tion by creating a subjective probability of greater than .5, but where 
another individual might desire, for some other reasons, to view more 
evidence. Tribe apparently would always prefer to be exposed to more 
evidence in such a case, but he provides no convincing argument that 
the case where the plaintiff uses only one particular type of evidence is 
analytically different, other than that he responds to it differently. 
Beyond this point, one should recall that the main incentive that a 
plaintiff will have to present any evidence available will be her concern 
that the defendant, once allowed to offer evidence, will produce infor-
mation tending to weaken the plaintiffs case. Tribe seems to suggest 
that admitting that the plaintiff can meet her burden of production by 
probability evidence alone is equivalent to handing her a victory. But 
the defendant will have something to say about that; he will usually be 
able to offer evidence tending to show that his bus was not involved, if 
that is the case. If the concern is primarily that incentives exist for the 
production of relevant evidence, it should be remembered that such 
incentives can affect the defendant as well as the plaintiff. If the plain-
tiff could show in her case that, for example, ninety-nine percent of all 
buses were owned by the defendant, might it not make most sense to 
shift to the defendant the incentive to come forward with more infor-
mation? To act otherwise seems to simply create a disincentive for the 
defendant to undertake steps to investigate the accident. 
Of course, there may be a number of instances when no more in-
formation will be available to either party no matter how hard each 
would try. For example, recall the still unanswered question of how 
Upham Sargent died in the woods.62 In relation to such cases, Tribe's 
Id. at 1341 n.37 (emphasis in original). 
It has been pointed out that information does not really come in two qualitatively distinct 
categories, "statistical" and "individualized." Saks & Kidd, supra note 53, at 151-54. Tribe is 
aware of this, but still finds the fact that people tend to believe there is a distinction important. 
I am, of course, aware that all factual evidence is ultimately "statistical," and all 
legal proof ultimately "probabilistic," in the epistemological sense that no conclusion 
can ever be drawn from empirical data without some step of inductive inference--even if 
only an inference that things are usually what they are perceived to be . . . . My con-
cern, however, is only with types of evidence and modes of proof that bring this proba-
bilistic element of inference to explicit attention in a quantified way. 
Tribe, supra note 9, at 1330 n.2 (emphasis in original; citation omitted). 
62. Sargent v. Massachusetts Accident Co., 307 Mass. 246, 29 N.E.2d 825 (1940). See supra 
notes 22-25 and accompanying text. 
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analysis expresses doubts about allowing the plaintiff in any such case 
to prevail, saying it would be "inefficient" as well as "unfair" to make 
the defendant company pay for all such accidents no matter how care-
fu1 its drivers have been. This statement is conclusory and highly ques-
tionable. Tribe enters into no efficiency-type analysis of the problem, 
nor will this Article. Still, it seems fair to ask why it would not be even 
less efficient to have a ru1e that allows the company to pay for none of 
the accidents caused by unidentified buses on Main Street no matter 
how much it uses the road nor how carelessly its drivers behave simply 
because in some instances particular buses are impossible to identify. 
Further, although it may seem unfair that a company should be 
forced to pay for an accident it had nothing to do with, the possibility 
of such unfairness arises every time a case is decided under conditions 
of uncertainty. Does Tribe mean to suggest that there is nothing even 
arguably unfair in a ru1e allowing the company to avoid responsibility 
for those accidents it did cause and therefore leaving accident victims 
without compensation? It is possible, as Tribe argues, that issues of 
efficiency and fairness might ultimately support his position; however, 
it must be recognized that these issues are far more difficult than he 
acknowledges. 
Perhaps the reason Tribe's arguments on this point appear so cas-
ual and weak-willed is that the principal thrust of his critique of mathe-
matics in the courtroom, at least in the private law context, is a concern 
with the general impression which is created in the community by pro-
ceeding in this fashion as opposed to the particular results from its use 
in a given case. Whether or not it is "unfair" in some deeper sense to 
make the company pay even though no fault has been shown, the sys-
tem would appear unfair, uncaring, and maybe even foolish if a de-
fendant were made to pay for an accident with which he had been in no 
way connected by the kind of evidence normally expected. In a portion 
of the article, captioned "The Dehumanization of Justice," Tribe elo-
quently advances his belief in the importance of trial as ritual. 
Methods of proof that impose moral blame or authorize offi-
cial sanctions on the basis of evidence that fails to penetrate 
or convince the untutored contemporary intuition threaten to 
make the legal system seem even more alien and inhuman 
than it already does to distressingly many. There is at stake 
not only the further weakening of the confidence of the par-
ties and oftheir willingness to abide by the result, but also the 
further erosion of the public's sense that the law's fact-finding 
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apparatus is functioning in a somewhat comprehensible way, 
on the basis of evidence that speaks, at least in general terms, 
to the larger community that the processes of adjudication 
must ultimately serve. The need now is to enhance commu-
nity comprehension of the trial process, not to exacerbate an 
already serious problem by shrouding the process in mathe-
matical obscurity. 
One element, at least, of that ritual of conflict-settlement 
is the presence and functioning of the jury-a cumbersome 
and imperfect institution, to be sure, but an institution well 
calculated, at least potentially, to mediate between "the law" 
in the abstract and the human needs of those affected by it. 
Guided and perhaps intimidated by the seeming inexorability 
of numbers, induced by the persuasive force of formulas and 
the precision of decimal points to perceive themselves as per-
forming a largely mechanical and automatic role, few ju-
rors-whether in criminal cases or in civil-could be relied 
upon to recall, let alone to perform, this humanizing function, 
to employ their intuition and their sense of community values 
to shape their ultimate conclusions. 
When one remembers these things, one must aclrnowl-
edge that there was a wisdom of sorts even in trial by battle-
for at least that mode of ascertaining truth and resolving con-
flict reflected well the deeply-felt beliefs of the times and 
places in which it was practiced. This is something that can 
hardly be said of trial by mathematics today.63 
103 
An initial observation about this passage is that it appears to contain an 
element of inconsistency. Tribe is concerned that jurors will be overly 
deferential to mathematical evidence and analysis and, therefore, too 
quick to give it credence and to be influenced by it. At the same time, 
he asserts that this type of material at trial "fails to penetrate or con-
vince the untutored contemporary intuition."64 If such evidence speaks 
so convincingly to the lay juror, why would it not have the same effect 
when it becomes known to "the larger community that the process of 
adjudication must ultimately serve"?65 Of course, the two situations 
may be quite different, but it is not clear that they are and Tribe him-
self says nothing to support this. 
63. Tribe, supra note 9, at 1375-77 (footnotes omitted). 
64. Id. at 1376. 
65. Id. 
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As pointed out earlier, Tribe simply assumes certain facts about 
how jurors react to mathematical evidence and his assumptions have 
been questioned on the empirical evidence available. He likewise as-
sumes that litigating parties and the general public would have the 
same uneasy and distrustful feeling about "trial by mathematics" that 
he has. Tribe offers no supportive evidence to demonstrate how the 
present trial process creates respect and confidence in its decisions, nor 
how a change in the system would create a different community 
appreciation. 
Commenting on Tribe's argument that one problem with mathe-
matical procedure in the courtroom is that it makes explicit the fact 
that the system allows some finite number of erroneous verdicts as the 
price paid for other ends,66 psychologists Saks and Kidd remark: 
[S]uch a deliberate turning away from reality may serve 
neither the law nor the defendant. First of all, the symbolism 
is so at variance with the objective reality. . . and the subjec-
tive experience of judges and jurors, that this may be one 
more of the legal fictions that tend to undermine the law's 
own credibility. An institution that would so deliberately ig-
nore real, measurable doubt and assert not that it has made 
the best decision it was able to but that it is "certain" it is 
correct, is unlikely to keep the masquerade going forever or to 
fool everyone. That is the harm that may be done the court.67 
For these authors, the legal system would best find support for its deci-
sions by appearing to operate on the available techniques of what 
might be called scientific decisionmaking.68 
In reality, Tribe's arguments about the valuable ritual components 
of trial are based not on his knowledge about what the "deeply-felt 
beliefs" of our time are, but on his own opinions about what the funda-
mental beliefs of the society should be at their best. If this is the objec-
66. Id. at 1372-75. 
67. Saks & Kidd, supra note 53, at 156. 
68. Consider also the following remark by Tribe in the introduction to his article: 
[A]lthough the mathematical or pseudo-mathematical devices which a society embraces 
to rationalize its systems for adjudication may be quite comprehensible to a student of 
that society's customs and culture, those devices may nonetheless operate to distort-
and, in some instances, to destroy-important values which that society means to express 
or to pursue through the conduct of legal trials. 
Tribe, supra note 9, at 1330. Those important values can only be recognized by a student of a 
society through a careful and respectful examination of the ways that society goes about its impor-
tant business. The best datum available is a thorough understanding of the "rationalizations" 
which the co=unity does indeed embrace. 
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tive in his work, there may be much in it which can be agreed with, but 
the exact nature of his propositions should be more clearly spelled out. 
In his article, Tribe gives primary attention to the criminal trial 
and is explicit about the elements of the ritual with which he is most 
deeply concerned. He refers to the presumption of innocence, the 
rights to counsel and confrontation, and the privilege against self-in-
crimination as "the principles [the community] holds important."69 It 
is clear, however, that he believes these to be principles that the com-
munity should hold in high regard. Consider how he would respond to 
an observation, which might be made, that the majority of the popula-
tion has lost respect for the criminal justice system because its insis-
tence on these principles seems to result in letting criminals escape 
penalties because of technicalities. The legal system should, of course, 
acknowledge and show respect for the "deeply-felt beliefs" of the soci-
ety of which it is a part, but it must also recognize that by its processes 
it can affect those beliefs for good or for worse. As Tribe remarks, 
there may indeed have been a "wisdom of sorts"70 even in trial by bat-
tle in its time, but even so, the legal system of that time, and in particu-
lar legal scholars, would have been obliged to seek out improved 
methods and to make them available and understandable to the public. 
Do scholars now investigating the use of formal decision theory, 
mathematics and statistics, as these apply to the preponderance of evi-
dence standard and to other questions in procedure, have a better way? 
Only time will say. For the present, it should be stressed that advanc-
ing these ideas does not necessarily, as Tribe seems to feel, ignore the 
variety of complex and competing values which a trial serves in our 
society. Instead, such thinking emphasizes a different "ritualistic" per-
spective than Tribe does, but an important one nevertheless. There is 
value, of course, in the trial process retaining ''human'' qualities and 
dimensions. But, there is value as well in the legal system's being 
viewed as concerned about its errors and receptive to available re-
sources which may serve, consistent with other important principles, to 
lessen those errors.71 
69. Tribe, supra note 9, at 1391-92. 
70. Id. at 1392. 
71. An interesting question for the present generation oflawyers which illustrates this tension 
between "precision and ritual" is how we should respond to the increasing amount of empirical 
evidence regarding the lack of accuracy of eyewitness testimony. We have long recognized that 
courts are particularly comfortable permitting findings to be based on such testimony even though 
we may feel it is no more probative than "statistical" evidence. which is not as well received. H. 
HART & J. McNAUGHTON, EVIDENCE AND INFERENCE IN THE LAW 54-55 (1958). It also seems 
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VI. "EQUALIZING" ERRORS 
Professor Tribe criticizes those who would inject mathematics into 
the trial process, because he finds them concerned with only one crite-
rion of decisionmaking, the minimization of the absolute number of 
erroneous decisions, to the exclusion of other less objective criteria. 
Yet one of the writers most responsible for the increasing interest in 
"trial by mathematics," Professor Finkelstein, was the one to bring for-
ward a very different objective than minimization of errors. He sug-
gests that "trial by mathematics" gives support to Tribe's insistence on 
the need for particularized evidence in cases where background statis-
tics have been introduced. Finkelstein points out that the decision rule 
which minimizes errors, the rule of .5 or greater, cannot be assumed to 
meet one of the possible objectives in that it will not necessarily treat 
the parties equally in the sense of distributing the expected errors 
evenly between the plaintiff and the defendant. 72 This is certainly not 
an intuitively easy conclusion to appreciate, and both Finkelstein and 
Professor Kaye, in his review of this argument,73 offer lengthy numeri-
cal examples to make the point. 
This Article does not attempt to duplicate such proofs but only to 
give a characterization of the results. In the hypothesized situation, a 
value P(X) has been assigned, based on many trials, corresponding to 
the degree of belief held in the plaintiffs assertion X after all the evi-
dence has been given. There is, thus, a large collection of values of 
P(X), ranging from zero to one. There is no reason to think these val-
ues would be evenly distributed. Suppose, for example, that in a large 
majority of the cases, the plaintiffs case had been very convincing; that 
is, the various values of P(X), while they ranged all over the spectrum, 
were most often found on the high side, say in the range of .6 to .8. In 
deciding what value of P(X) to choose to minimize errors, the greater 
than .5 rule is still the answer. Under this rule, of course, more verdicts 
that court decisions based on such identification testimony are among those most representative of 
the "ritual" elements of trial which Tribe stresses. 
In recent years, however, we have been made distressingly aware of how often such eyewit-
ness testimony is mistaken and how it is much less reliable than it is generally perceived to be. 
See E. LOFTUS, EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY (1979). The ''untutored contemporary intuition" may 
have great respect for and faith in the reliance on such testimony at trial, but the scientific findings 
of inaccuracy and misuse cannot be ignored. Surely, the law must respond to this new informa-
tion by attempting to take measures designed for greater precision. For further discussion, see 
Weinstein, Book Review, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 441 (1981) (reviewing E. LOFTUS, EYEWITNESS TES-
TIMONY (1979». 
72. M. FINKELSTEIN, SIIpra note 10, at 67-68. 
73. Kaye, SIIpra note 18. 
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for plaintiffs than defendants result, but this presents no problem. 
Plaintiffs on the whole were presenting stronger cases. Additionally, 
however, the expected number of errors favoring plaintiffs will be far 
higher than the expected number of errors favoring defendants. 
In the example given by Kaye,74 for instance, the .5 decision rule 
yields twenty-nine expected erroneous verdicts for plaintiffs and only 
eight expected errors in favor of defendants. Thus, the .5 rule produced 
an expected number of errors totaling thirty-seven. In this example, if 
the court decided on a rule awarding a verdict to plaintiff only if P(X) 
were greater than .65, twenty errors could be expected to favor defend-
ants and twenty-one to favor plaintiffs. The higher burden of persua-
sion has increased the "equality" of the procedure in some sense, but at 
the price of creating a greater number of expected errors. 
Finkelstein argues that the equalization of errors as a distinct goal 
may influence the interpretation of the preponderance standard: 
[T]he maximization of correct results is a strong policy, but 
one not invariably to be preferred when others conflict with 
it. . . . Whether equalization of errors is the goal in any 
given context ought to depend on the extent to which total 
error would be increased by the pursuit of the equality, the 
degree of inequality if minimum error is achieved, and the 
relative importance of the competing policies.7s 
But how to take account of this equalization policy when the particular 
rule which would equalize errors would be, as Finkelstein admits, "un-
known and in most cases unknowable"?76 He suggests that while it 
may not be possible to fashion an "equalizing" rule directly, this goal is 
furthered by an approach to the preponderance standard such as in the 
Sargent opinion and in Tribe's analysis: 
[I]nsistence on particular evidence should be regarded not 
only as a way of reducing total error, but more significantly, 
as a way of distributing error more equally between plaintiffs 
and defendants over some assumed class of cases with a com-
mon subject matter. The insistence of the Sargent court on 
such evidence may be taken as an indication that both these 
purposes are condensed in the standard of proof by a prepon-
derance of evidence.77 
74. Id. at 604-07. This example yielded a total of 130 decisions for plaintiffs and only 18 for 
defendants. Id. at 604. 
75. M. FINKELSTEIN, supra note 10, at 69. 
76. Id. at 73. 
77. Id. at 78. See id. at 69. 
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Professor Kaye has pointed out the error in this argument.78 Both his 
and Finkelstein's numerical examples of the equalization test result in 
the plaintiff establishing a probability substantially in excess of .5, but 
this is only because of the distribution of the numbers P(X) used as an 
example. If the distribution of P(X) were different, so that it leaned 
more towards lower values, the test would call for a decision in favor of 
the plaintiff when P(X) was lower than.5. This is surely not what the 
Sargent opinion, Tribe, or anyone else has in mind. 
Kaye, in going beyond this observation, questions the value of this 
type of "equalization": 
Mistakes do not cancel one another out: it is no solace to the 
defendant who should have prevailed but did not that some-
where there is or will be a similarly affected plaintiff. Unless 
plaintiffs and defendants are different sorts of people such 
that defendants deserved to be favored, I cannot imagine why 
we should seek this sort of "equality.,,79 
Kaye additionally argues that the greater than .5 rule itself "incorpo-
raters] the only meaningful principle of equality between plaintiffs and 
defendants,"80 in that its derivation followed from the assumption of 
equality of the disutility of all errors whether they go against one party 
or the other. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
This discussion of the distribution of expected errors serves princi-
pally to remind us of how little we know and can ever hope to know 
about the ultimate wisdom of our decisions. We expect there will be 
errors, but in general we will never discover which decisions are our 
mistakes, nor will we know the actual level or distribution of the errors. 
Against such uncertainty the preponderance of the evidence standard 
seems a puny tool indeed. It is no wonder that writers would want to 
see it as stronger than it is or to improve upon it if they could. But the 
uncertainty about everything except that there will be errors remains 
undiminished. If anything, it grows the more closely we observe it, 
much to our displeasure. The interpretation of the preponderance stan-
dard as a preponderance of probabilities rule, calling only for a subjec-
tive probability of anything greater than .5, seems in this light to offer 
78. Kaye, supra note 18, at 607. 
79. fd. 
80. fd. at 608. Kaye even suggests a third possible meaning of "equality," in that we could 
ask that the proportion of verdicts for each party which are erroneous be equal. Id. at 606 n.2I. 
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more than might first have been imagined. It is a crude standard by 
any measure, but it offers us something which can be of great value, the 
expectation of the minimal number of errors in decisions. In and of 
itself, the choice of this rule and the enunciation of this as a goal may 
have great "ritualistic" value of the type Professor Tribe cautions us to 
consider. Trying to be right as often as possible may be the best we can 
do.81 
81. Forthright consideration of the risks of error inherent in the trial process as a way of 
approaching questions of burden of proof has recently received support from the United States 
Supreme Court. See Santosky v. Kramer, 102 S.Ct. 1388 (1982); Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 
418 (1979). 
